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SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL PRACTICE:
UNGER'S BRAZILIAN JOURNALISM
William H. Simon *
Roberto Mangabeira Unger is a citizen of Brazil. While working on
Politics, his large-scale treatise on social theory, he has been active in his
country's politics. Among the fruits of these activities is a series of political and programmatic commentaries on Brazil published in the Brazilian press. The commentaries apply the style of political analysis and the
general political program elaborated in Politics to the recent circumstances of Brazil. Thus, they give an extended illustration of Unger's
general social theory.' At the same time, they exemplify a form of political writing that attempts to combine ambitious critical social theory
with popular journalistic policy discussion.
Unger's major journalistic efforts, on which I will focus here, are
two series of articles published in the largest Brazilian newspaper, A
Folha de Sao Paulo. The first is The Country in a Daze, a seven-part
essay published as part of a special supplement entitled Brazil After Geisel in January 1979.2 The second is The TransformativeAlternative, consisting of fourteen linked pieces published separately
on the paper's "op3
ed" page between December 1984 and April 1985.
• Professor of Law, Stanford University; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1 Some of the themes of the Brazilian pieces are summarized in SOCIAL THEORY at 67-79.
2 Unger, 0 Brasil Depois de Geisel: 0 PalsAs Tontas [Brazil After Geisel: The Country in a
Daze], Folha de Sao Paulo, Jan. 14, 1979, Caderno Especial. This and the Brazilian publications
cited in notes 3, 6, and 11 are on file in the Harvard Law Library and at the Northvestern University
Law Review.
3 The series, entitled A Alternativa Transformadora[The Transformative Alternative], consists
of the following pieces, each published on the "op-ed" page (page 3 of the "'Opinao'"section) of the
Folha de Sao Paulo on the indicated date: (1) 0 Probleinae a Tarefa [The Problem and the Task],
Dec. 20, 1984; (2) A EstrategiaPoliticada Transicao [The Political Strategy of the Transition], Dec.
27, 1984; (3) A Economica Politica da Transicao, [The Political Economy of the Transition], Jan. 3,
1985; (4) Uma Trajetoria Economica-PrimeiroEstagio [An Economic Trajectory-First Stage],
Jan. 3, 1985; (5) Uma Trajetoria Econoinica-SegundoEstagio [An Economic Trajectory-Second
Stage], Jan. 9, 1985; (6) Unia Trajetoria Econoinica: A Politica de Conjuntura [The Politics of the
Short Term], Jan. 17, 1985; (7) 0 Ideario Constitucional: Puntos de Partida [The Constitutional
Ideas: Starting Points], Jan 27, 1985; (8) 0 Ideario Constitucional 0 PresidencialismoReformada
[The Constitutional Ideas: The Presidential Regime Reformed], Feb. 14, 1985; (9) 0 Ideario Constitucional: A Burocracia Subordinado [The Constitutional Ideas: The Bureaucracy Subordinated],
Feb. 15, 1985; (10) 0 Ideario Constitucional: A DecentralizacaoAntioligarquica[The Constitutional
Ideas: Anti-oligarchical Decentralization], Feb. 19, 1985; (11) 0 Ideario Constitucional: 0 Estado E
As Organizacoes Populares[The Constitutional Ideas: The State and the Mass Organization], Feb.
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Unger's journalistic style in Portuguese differs little from the style of
his theoretical writings in English. It eschews jargon, portrays abstract
ideas with high drama, resorts constantly to dialectical (thesis-antithesissynthesis) exposition, sweepingly and often ironically characterizes people and events, and is occasionally unabashedly hortatory. If one compares this work to the journalistic efforts of some of the classic social
theorists, it resembles those of Marx and Keynes in its flair for dramatizing current events by infusing them with broad historical significance and
in its ability to criticize contemporary figures through pithy characterization. 4 But Unger's journalism seems more integrated with his social theory than that of Marx or Keynes. Unger makes more of an effort to
portray his general theoretical scheme in his journalism; much of the two
Folha series summarizes major sections of the argument of Politics. In
some respects, Unger's Brazilian writings seem more in the style of The
FederalistPapers and the eighteenth century pamphlet literature from
which it arose. Like The FederalistPapers, Unger's articles quite explicitly and systematically expound a general social theory in the course of
addressing current political issues and events.
I propose to describe the analysis in Unger's Brazilian journalism,
especially the two Folha series, that addresses most directly the circumstances of Brazil. What follows is partly interpretive summary, partly
close paraphrase. I have supplied a few basic background facts about
Brazil, but otherwise the account is drawn entirely from Unger's work.5
I.

BRAZIL IN A DAZE

At the beginning of 1979, when The Country in a Daze appeared,
Brazil seemed on the threshold of political liberalization. Increasingly
divided internally, the military regime that had seized power in 1964
confronted economic stagfiation and political challenge from a variety of
newly invigorated forms of popular mobilization, including the industrial
unions, rural workers, urban squatters, liberal professional organizations,
and church-affilated social action groups. The Geisel administration had
moderated official violence, made concessions to civil liberties, and ac27, 1985; (12) 0 Ideario Constitucional 0 Direito de Desestalizar [The Constitutional Ideas: The
Destabilization Right], Mar. 7, 1985; (13) 0 Problema Militar [The Military Problem], Mar. 28,
1985; (14) A Politica dos Relacoes Pessoais [The Politics of Personal Relations], Apr. 3, 1985. Related pieces published during this period are A Crise Que 0 BrasilAindaNao Conhece [A Crisis That
Brazil Has Yet to Recognize], Jan. 3, 1985; A Opcao Partidariados SocialistasBrasileiros[The Party
Option of the Brazilian Socialists], Mar. 19, 1985; Diretas-ja [Direct Elections Now], Nov. 23, 1985.
4 See J.M. KEYNES, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1931); K. MARX, The Eighteenth Brumaire of

Louis Napoleon, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 594 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978).
5 For relevant background on Brazil, see REDEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL (A. Stepan ed. forthcoming 1987); P. EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE,
AND LOCAL CAPITAL IN BRAZIL (1977); R. WESSON & D. FLEISCHER, BRAZIL IN TRANSITION

(1983); Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Law Regimes: The Contractualist and Corporatist Models Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001 (1986).
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ceded to a series of electoral reforms that seemed capable of leading to a
relatively open political system. Geisel was scheduled to step down in
March 1979, to be replaced by Joao Figuereido, a military candidate apparently committed to liberalization.
The dominant focus of The Country in a Daze is that of Politics-the
way ideas create and limit possibilities of transformation. Unger portrays Brazil in one of those situations for which Politics evokes passionate
interest: the established preconceptions about social organizations have
been unsettled but not replaced. The limits of possible transformation
have become blurred. Everyday struggles and ordinary ambitions now
sometimes appear to implicate larger social projects. The distinction between fighting within the social system and fighting about the system,
between the practical and the visionary, has become harder to draw.
Unger rejects the two most influential interpretations of the situation: the technocratic authoritarianism of the military regime's adherents and the Marxist or deep-logic social theory of the leftist intellectuals.
According to the former, only by repressing or dampening social conflicts and permitting the further enrichment of the already wealthy can
the nation achieve the savings and investment necessary to economic
growth. Concessions to popular consumption are appropriate only as
strategic maneuvers to stave off disruptive protest or as part of a gradual
long-term plan for the incorporation of fragments of the populace into
the regime. According to the latter interpretation, the military regime is
the creature of its contradictory position in the class structure-a petty
bourgeois group in the service of the high bourgeosie, crudely imitating
its masters but at the same time deeply resenting them. Transformative
politics must await the exacerbation of these contradictions and the undermining of the regime by economic crisis and consequent revolution.
In fact, the history of the military regime does not bear out either
interpretation. Contrary to the first interpretation, there are possibilities
in Brazil for combining economic growth with democracy. These possibilities result partly from an important development that the second
interpretation ignores or denies: the course of economic development
sponsored by the military regime subverted part of the power of the capitalist class in a way that went far beyond an expression of resentment,
though it stopped far short of revolution. Moreover, the disintegration of
the military regime has not occurred primarily through economic crisis,
and it is neither necessary nor possible to await some profound economic
crisis in order to fight effectively for democratization.
Unger pursues the theme of political possibility through examinations of Brazil's military, economy, class structure, and culture.
Throughout, as in Politics, he portrays patterns and institutions that have
structure but that preclude any deep or rigid logic; that are creatures of
purposeful social activity but that often escape the purposes and even
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understanding of their creators in sometimes surprising and ironic ways;
and that generate multiple possibilities for elaboration and development.
A.

The Military

Unger sees in the conventional maneuvers and disputes of everyday
political life a structure defined by interests and by preconceptions about
social possibilities. In the case of the increasingly insecure military regime of 1979, this structure takes the form of five dilemmas.
The first revolves around the constitutional facade of military rule.
On the one hand, the complete abandonment of constitutional pretensions would expose the regime to serious risks. It would alienate segments of the regime ideologically committed to "relative democracy."
More fundamentally, it would further politicize the military to an extent
that its own members might find alarming. In the absence of programmatic consensus within the regime, the military has depended on the restricted legislative and party system it has tolerated to resolve political
disputes that arise within its leadership. Without this system, such disputes would have to be resolved entirely within the military. In this situation, the military would be highly vulnerable either to factionalism or to
charismatic authoritarianism (caudilhismo). On the other hand, democratic concessions almost inevitably encumber the regime. The electoral
process legitimates opposition, and the call for further democratization
mobilizes and unifies the opposition. The opposition can occasionally
thwart the regime in unanticipated ways through the electoral machinery, thus necessitating either unwilling substantive concessions or embarrassing and delegitimating retractions of previous electoral concessions.
And the regime finds it difficult to cabin the political participation of the
lower classes so as to prevent such participation from spreading conflict
beyond the range acceptable to the electoral system.
The second dilemma concerns the means by which the military
might extricate itself from its situation. To legitimate a formula for transition to a civilian regime, the military would have to negotiate with organizations representative of broad segments of the population. Yet the
regime's political practice undermines the capacity of existing organizations to represent broad segments of the population. The regime refuses
to strengthen or create representative organizations for fear of losing control of them. Existing organizations are strong enough to harass the regime, for example, in the congress and the press, but they are too weak to
perform the representative function needed to legitimate a political
transition.
The third dilemma concerns the attempt to maintain cohesion
within the military regime. Basically, there are only two ways to accomplish this. One is constant deliberation among the officer class as a
whole. However, this approach promises to turn the military corps into
a forum of debate and intrigue. The other way is to concentrate power in
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a small circle of high officials, and ultimately, in the current president.
Yet this approach would isolate the regime, already isolated from the rest
of society, from the military itself.
The fourth dilemma arises from the divergence between the reigning
fantasies of capitalist development and the realities of government control over the economy. If the regime limited itself to subsidizing capitalists without any control over the allocation of investments, it could not
plausibly hope to achieve a satisfactory level of economic growth or a
measure of independence from foreign capital. Thus, the regime is
driven toward policies of economic control both by the need to protect its
economic goals from private investors and from its desire not to be seen
by the nation as the investors' lackeys. These controls earn it the ingratitude of big business without ingratiating the middle classes. To appeal to
the latter, it would be necessary either to adopt policies of open-handed
redistribution or to refocus the economy away from luxury consumption
and expensive consumer durables, toward the more modest consumption
goods of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisies. But such measures are
unacceptable to the regime. Thus, the regime has committed itself to
policies that isolate it even from the sectors of the society that it has most
benefitted.
The fifth dilemma is the most fundamental. It arises from the military's aversion to strong leadership. If the officers could find among
themselves a person of shrewd judgment, political talent, and popular
appeal, they would fear him. Such a person would push the regime to
take risks other than the ones of procrastination and obliviousness that
the military is willing to run. This attitude has caused the elevation of
official mediocrity from an unfortunate habit to a sacred principle. "For
fear of political lions, Brazil is governed by political ostriches." Thus,
the distance between the severity of the nation's problems and the capacity of the government to deal with them increases.
The common theme of the five dilemmas is a fatalistic sense of the
inevitability of impasse. Failure of vision leaves the military regime incapable of taking the initiative and subjects it to the constant sense of being
dragged along by events.
B.

The Economy

Brazil's political economy presents a distinctive variation of the general problems common to the economies of the relatively wealthy capitalist nations. The general pattern (which is analyzed extensively in
Politics) is this: The government commits itself to stimulating and maintaining economic growth by augmenting demand. In the early stages of
the pattern, production and purchasing power can be increased together
with relative ease because there is substantial idle capacity. New workers
can be added to existing enterprises without difficulty. The government
absorbs part of the newly created wealth and uses it to generate further
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demand through public expenditures and transfers. But the capitalists
rarely respond to the increase in demand with the kind of ambitious investments needed rapidly to expand capital stock and increase productivity. They prefer a slower, more cautious rhythm of investment. Why?
Because they distrust the willingness of the government to protect their
profit margins and defend them from the demands of their workers. And
they fear that the state will deprive them of their gains through taxation.
The consequent slowness with which output and productivity expand in
relation to demand contributes to inflation and aggravates the conflicts
between employers and workers, as well as conflicts between different
groups of workers. The government then feels compelled to fight inflation through fiscal austerity or monetary contraction. This policy is typically strong enough to provoke recession but not strong enough to
control inflation. When the government again ventures to foster growth,
it again resorts to fiscal and monetary demand-stimulation measures that
entail the same problems. The large early gains in national wealth become a thing of the past.
The core of this pattern is a particular relation between government
and the capitalists. On the one hand, no matter how redistributive the
officials' ambitions, they cannot ignore the capitalists' interests. If a government of the left undertakes to redistribute too much or to curtail drastically control over capital, the capitalists withdraw their investments:
economic growth stalls, inflation grows, the electorate becomes disillusioned, and the party in power finds itself abandoned by many of its former friends. On the other hand, no matter how pro-capitalist their
loyalties, the officials have difficulty giving the capitalists the degree of
support and security they require to make the level of investment needed
for high productivity and employment. The required level of support
and security would affront widely held notions of social justice. It would
also subject government policy more and more to the discretion of big
business and the wealthy. Moreover, the opposition and the unions can
often frustrate such attempts, and the prospect of future elections is constantly threatening to disrupt economic policy.
There are two approaches to breaking the control that private capital and management exercise over the conditions of collective prosperity
and to resolving the difficulties that arise from this control. First, the
regime could consolidate a nationalized leadership sector of the economy. Second, it could try to influence the pattern of investment by placing general restrictions on capital. Both approaches are politically
difficult to implement. Capital and labor interests often try to block
them. More importantly, trying to implement such policies gradually
creates difficulties of transition: before new centers of development can
be consolidated, the old ones contract and disintegrate, creating both material losses and the threat of electoral defeat for the reforming
government.
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In Brazil during the authoritarian regime, both approaches have
been carried further than they have in any of the advanced capitalist
countries. The brutal imperative of accumulation, the dynamic of centralization of power, the confidence that domestic and foreign capitalists
placed for many years in the government, and the manipulative flexibility
created by the suppression of democracy converged to make possible a
powerful public enterprise sector unprecedented in Brazilian history and
unrivaled among the industrialized capitalist countries of the world. The
nationalized sector developed into an economic engine capable of responding to the demands of public economic planning and of establishing
an investment process substantially independent of private investors, and
not-as in most Western countries-into a graveyard for declining industries or a mechanism of subsidizing unionized workers. At the same
time, the government acquired preeminent influence over the profitability
of private investment through its control over credit, prices, and currency exchange.
The fact that this subversion of the autonomy of capital has occurred simultaneously with the unprecedented enrichment of the capitalists and the repression of the workers shows that it does not represent a
deliberate assault on the high bourgeoisie. Yet this development has an
important consequence. While enriching the capitalists, the military regime has undermined the basis of their power. It has created a structure
that could make the nation less vulnerable to the kind of blackmail in
which capitalists threaten to disrupt the economy through disinvestment
if their privileges are not respected or augmented.
This line of thought suggests that the primary concern of a democratic socialist movement in Brazil-or of any reform movementshould be to safeguard and strengthen this unintended legacy of the
regime of 1964. This legacy is the structural precondition for an economic policy of institutional democratization and redistribution of
wealth that is compatible with economic growth. The movement must
subordinate-or ideally, coordinate-policies of redistribution and support for popular consumption to the goal of maintaining growth. Without growth, efforts at social transformation would flounder in economic
chaos, and violence and dictatorship would be required for the reconstruction of the society.
The relative freedom of government action in planning economic
policy makes it possible to continue the process of accumulation with less
deference to the interests of private investors. It facilitates the mobilization of the savings of the middle and lower classes, since a state that
possesses the instruments for guaranteeing the level of profitability of the
investments of the wealthy already possesses the means for substituting
the beneficiaries of such protection. It could give officials the ability to
re-orient private and public investments toward popular consumption
and the advantage of the work force. It could permit a redistribution of
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wealth through the tax system, allow the provision of social services, and
permit the reform of administrative and pay hierarchies in enterprise. It
could give the country the opportunity to achieve greater independence
from the international capitalist system, while at the same time preserving its ability to enter into specific agreements with foreign investors.
C.

Class Structure

Some aspects of the Brazilian social structure seem enigmatic, especially from the perspective of the wealthy Western countries. In order to
come to terms with them, one must abandon the premise that in every
historical situation, classes have well-defined boundaries and that they
speak with a single voice.
The first fact that requires attention has been widely observed,
though the reasons for it remain obscure. The urban middle classes-the
great majority of merchants, professionals, and functionaries-have
never gained in Brazil the relative independence of action that distinguishes comparable groups in Western Europe and North America. This
is not merely a matter of dependence on the state for favors, since such
dependence is common throughout the West. More fundamentally, it is
a reflection of the fact that the economic and political power of this
group has been so precarious, and the obstacles to the transmission of its
achieved social status to its children have been so great that the group
has remained in a social and ideological ghetto. This is so despite the
fact that this group furnished a large number of the politicians who governed the pre-1964 parliamentary regimes, as well as most of the lawyers,
journalists, and theorists who articulated the ideals of these regimes. Politically this group has often leaned either toward a contemptuous rejection of politics altogether or toward support for the dominant elites.
Occasionally it has sublimated its resentment in grand reform campaigns
that did not seriously challenge the status quo, but it has never developed
a transformative political practice.
Another surprising fact of Brazilian history has been less noticed
but in the long run is more important. This is the relative absence of
hostility among the lower classes. Basic conflicts between the organized
and relatively prosperous industrial workers on the one hand and the
unorganized, under-employed, and generally disadvantaged urban
masses on the other have not developed in Brazil. This is especially interesting because in Brazil the industrial working class continues to be a
genuine labor aristocracy even as the military regime has suppressed
much of its economic freedom. In the major industrial powers of the
West, conflict between the relatively securely employed and well-paid organized working class and the under-employed, impoverished, and unorganized workers is one of the decisive facts of political life--one which
forms a major obstacle to a working class movement committed to social
transformation.
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A second conflict conspicuously absent is the one that might have
been expected between the middle and lower classes in the countryside
and those in the city. Brazilian industrial development has occurred at
the cost of the impoverishment of Brazilian agriculture, and thus urban
wages are generally much higher than rural ones. The situation cannot
be explained in terms of the deal between urban and rural interests that
permits the latter to share in the fruits of industrialization. This deal has
always been negotiated at the level of the elites; it does not explain the
conduct of the masses. Nor is it sufficient to point to the ease of migration from the countryside to the cities. Large numbers of people remain
in the countryside and have economic interests there, involving such
matters as the prices of agricultural products, the rates of pay for rural
labor, and export policy, all of which are directly opposed, at least in the
short run, to those of the urban workers. Why have conventional politicians not taken advantage of this latent conflict, as they did in many
European countries, such as nineteenth-century Germany?
Each of these paradoxes contains an important lesson for the conduct of a Brazilian working class party. Consider first the case of the
urban middle classes. In the two recent periods in which the state
achieved substantial autonomy from the elites, it failed to win the support of these middle groups and in fact ended up antagonizing them. In
the Goulart era (1961-1964), they were alienated by an aggressive populistic rhetoric made all the more frightening by explosive inflation and
consequent economic disorganization. The result was the aggravation of
hostility between the middle classes and the politically active sectors of
the masses and a close reconciliation between the middle class and the
dominant elites. The subsequent military regime opened unprecedented
opportunities of mobility for the middle classes, but it too failed to secure
their support. They were disenchanted by the military's technocratic
elitism with its open disdain for liberal rhetoric and by the modesty of
the improvements in their economic position relative to that of the dominant elites. Thus substantial numbers of the middle class began to vote
for the opposition party.
Although they have never gained the level of power they have
sought, the middle classes have been one of the most important determinants of national politics. The attitudes of this group cannot be explained either in terms of a natural alliance of interests with the wealthy
or in terms of a congenital tendency to be gulled by the ideas of the
wealthy. One of the most delicate tasks of a Brazilian democratic socialist movement is to show to this group that its interests are not in conflict
with such a movement. In programmatic terms, this means the protection of small property, both rural and urban; security against inflation for
small investment, if necessary through the use of fiscal and monetary
policy to subsidize it; the overhaul of the tax system to soak the rich and
undermine inheritance; the design of public enterprises as models of effi-
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ciency and channels of mobility for the children of the middle classes; the
scrupulous disdain for rhetoric calculated to incite indignation and fear
among the middle classes; and the reinterpretation of the ideas of Brazilian liberalism as a more ample vision of democracy.
Now consider the second mystery: the absence of conflict between
the organized industrial work force and the comparatively disadvantaged, under-employed urban masses. Various hypotheses might be
advanced to explain the lack of such conflict, which is strikingly characteristic of the advanced capitalist countries. First, there is the rapidity
and the unsettling effect of the rural-urban dislocation. A large part of
the urban lower classes consists of people who arrived from the country
too recently to have acquired fixed social identities and well-defined antagonisms. Second, even the best paid workers in the large industries live
in a precarious state: they lack the organization necessary to defend their
jobs and prerogatives against the mob beating at the doors. Third, Brazilian capitalism prefers to industrialize with advanced machinery oriented toward production of luxury goods. Since wages represent a
relatively small fraction of the costs of this kind of production, industry
has often been willing to pay wages well above what the market dictates
in the hope of securing the loyalty of a docile and experienced workforce.
Fourth, the workers inside and outside the privileged sector have
developed a complex network of family, patronage, and friendship relationships. The salary paid to the organized workers often goes to support
less advantaged people. These ties have muted the impact of disparities
between the two groups. Fifth, the weakness of the union movement and
its repression under the authoritarian regime have blurred the lines separating the privileged and disadvantaged sectors. Large numbers of unionized workers become employed or unemployed in accordance with the
fluctuations of the business cycle. In the wealthy capitalist countries, the
unorganized sector of the masses is used to reconcile the guarantees won
by the union movement with the freedom of the capitalists to expand or
cut back production in accordance with fluctuations in demand. The unorganized sector, which can be employed or dismissed easily, suffers the
brunt of economic instability. Because the boundary between the privileged and the disadvantaged fluctuates more in Brazil than in the advanced countries, a settled line of antagonism is less likely to develop.
Sixth, the subtlety of racial mixture in Brazil-the blurring of color
and ethnic distinctions within the lower classes-accounts for a distinctive facet of popular unity. Color and ethnic distinctions accentuate the
distance between the elites and the poor and gives them a sense of naturalness or necessity. It encourages the lighter-complexioned members of
the lower classes to aspire for easier incorporation into the white middle
classes. It aggravates distrust among the lower classes and furnishes an
insidious racial vocabulary in which to articulate it. In Brazil, however,
no clear racial and ethnic dichotomy exists to aggravate or solidify the
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economic distinctions between the privileged working class and the urban masses.
Even if all these hypotheses were confirmed by empirical research,
there would remain an unexplicable element to the phenomenon. In
spite of all the qualifications, the material interests of these two groups of
workers are in conflict. The fact that this theoretical conflict has not
become open antagonism must be credited in part to the styles of imagination and conduct that characterize the Brazilian working masses.
The absence of conflict between the privileged and underprivileged
sectors of the lower classes is a valuable and unintended gift to the Brazilian popular movement. To safeguard this gift, the movement needs a
specific social program. The starting point of this program would be the
free, immediate, and total unionization of workers in every sector of the
labor market. The more encompassing unionization becomes, the less
the risk that union boundaries reflect or create hierarchical distinctions.
This policy requires a principle of organization that avoids not only
unionization along the lines of each separate enterprise (as in Japan), but
also the limitation of each union to a single well-defined stage of the
economy. To enhance both the political power of the unions and their
capacity to exercise pressure on employers, they should be organized in
terms of broad sectors that include all workers involved in a particular
industrial or commercial area. For example, in the automobile industry,
the union should include not only the employees in the large central production and assembly plants, but also the less organized and well-paid
workers in the smaller satellite enterprises. The practical effect of this
policy would be to weaken at the outset any conflict between aristocrats
and plebes within the work force.
Other policies would also foster solidarity among the various elements of the working classes. In the short run, full employment policy
would moderate tensions arising from competition for scarce jobs. In the
long run, the reorientation of industry toward popular consumption and
more labor-intensive technology would avoid the danger of an implicit
alliance between industrial workers and rich consumers, an alliance
likely to strengthen divisions within the working classes.
The other potential conflict conspicuously absent in Brazil is between the urban and rural masses. Modern regimes have favored industrial development at the expense of agricultural development, have
squeezed rural producers to subsidize urban consumption, and have declined to confront the landed oligarchies that dominate the countryside
through both open violence and control of political machines. This state
of affairs has benefitted urban workers in some respects and swelled their
ranks by encouraging mass migration from the country, but it has done
little for small rural landowners and workers. The danger of this-as yet
latent-conflict would increase as Brazil became more democratic and
more socialist. As the rural masses became more politically active and
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self-conscious, they might come to see a divergence of interest with their
urban counterparts over such matters as the relative pricing of agricultural and industrial products and the distribution of government assistance between agriculture and industry.
The danger would be less severe for development strategies that seek
to strengthen small and medium-scale family operations through technical assistance, credit, and marketing facilities than it would be for the
strategies of consolidating agricultural production in large-scale, capitalintensive enterprises favored by the state technocrats, the urban business
elite, and the leftist intelligentsia. In embracing the latter strategies,
some are influenced, not only by the preconceptions of both capitalist
and Marxist theory about the necessary course of economic development,
but also by a fear that the former strategy would necessarily foster a large
reactionary petty bourgeoisie. In fact, from the point of view of the danger of rural-urban conflict, the strategy of capital intensive industrialization is the least risky, if only because it would empty the countryside. In
other respects, outside of a few areas where large scale production is already established or required by technological considerations, the petty
bourgeois strategy is more promising. It would most effectively engage
the talents and ambitions of large numbers of small producers and workers who have strong commitments to agriculture. It would require less
capital and cause less human dislocation. And most important, it would
create the basis for a vigorous and autonomous electorate in the
countryside.
Such an electorate would undermine the conservative rural party
machines that, aided by the disproportionate representation of rural
states in the legislature, have long provided powerful opposition to progressive reform. There is no reason to assume that this electorate would
be conservative. A national progressive movement seriously committed
to strengthening small and medium-scale agriculture and securing small
rural property should be able to win its support. The petty bourgeois
strategy would also avoid further swelling the cities and thus aggravating
the accompanying social problems, and it would preserve valuable forms
of social life in the countryside. Finally, the petty bourgeois strategy
would limit the subordination of Brazilian agriculture to the international economy. The industrialization strategy makes the economy more
vulnerable to domination by foreign capital and to the vicissitudes of international commodities markets.
Unger concludes this section with a warning of the dangers for a
popular movement of rigid presuppositions about the identities of its possible allies and enemies, but he qualifies the point in a way that gives it a
paradoxical quality. On the one hand, dogmatic presuppositions about
the possible configurations of the political map restrict the left's strategic
options and hamper its capacity to imagine social transformations. On
the other hand, when a political movement treats all collective divisions
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as arbitrary and infinitely manipulable, it loses its grounding in a conception of goals and projects that transcends transitory party conflicts, and
the fight for power becomes an end in itself. The only solution to this
paradox is the attempt, always difficult and dangerous, to preserve a
sense of distance between the movement's fundamental principles and its
specific alliances and pronouncements. There is no rule as to when the
principles require modification or abandonment of the alliances and pronouncements, and indeed experience with the latter will sometimes suggest modification of the former. Thus, the line between a movement's
basic political identity and its immediate political circumstances can
rarely be more than a precarious one.
D. PoliticalReform
In this section Unger sketches the vision that Politics calls "empowered democracy" which is more extensively elaborated in The Transformative Alternative, discussed below.
E.

CulturalStyle

This section is a portrait of the various strata of Brazilian society in
terms of cultural style, that is "the kind of alliance worked out between
the passions and institutions." Unger argues that the society's distinctive
modes of sociability create and limit political possibilities and that a thoroughgoing political transformation would have to reach them.
He begins with an image of sociability that is often portrayed as the
Brazilian national character but that is in fact characteristic principally
of the elites. The image portrays a dialectic of cynicism and sentimentality. The sentimental dimension is expressed in the capacity to give a
veneer of affection to relations of dependence and domination, in the tendency to devalue impersonal duties in favor of loyalty to family, friends,
and clients; in the tendency to view the public world of work as a means
of fulfilling private personal obligations; in the readiness to break established rules when they conflict with the demands of personal relationships; in the idea that amiability can excuse failures of reliability and
integrity; and in the proclivity for extravagant demonstrations of affection. The cynical dimension appears in the indifference to solemn
promises, obligations of work, and time schedules of every sort; in the
shirking of collective tasks; in the skepticism toward ideals that would
sacrifice immediate interests and personal ties to long term public goals;
in the energetic quest for worldly pleasures; and in an intransigent agnosticism often masked in a confused religiosity. The sentimental and the
cynical are two sides of the same coin: the cultivation of the immediate,
the refusal to live for the transcendent.
This culture of the established elites has a shadow. The shadow culture is expressed in a set of institutions that convey an opposed vision of
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sociability. These institutions are the church, the armed forces, and the
communist political parties. In Brazil these institutions have a distinctive affinity that arises from their opposition to the established elite culture. This affinity can be seen in various themes. First, there is the
importance of ideals that generate rules of conduct. Second, there is the
posture of asceticism, often genuine and noble. Third, there is the emphasis on ties of organization: the sanctity of promises, the sense of individual responsibility for collective goals, the sense of personal mission
brought to public undertakings. Fourth, and overlapping the first three,
there is the condemnation of the established elite culture, which is identified with the nation as a whole: a desire to wage war against society and
reconstruct it in the image of the shadow culture (a desire moderated in
the case of the church either by sympathy for the oligarchs or by genuine
Christian charity).
The urban middle classes and professional groups have no coherent
attitude toward the conflict between the established elite culture and the
shadow culture. At times, they zealously mimic the elites; at times, they
share the indignation of the shadow. Most often, they seem to do both at
the same time, thus giving a paradoxical cast to Brazilian middle class
culture.
Unger argues that this polarized cultural scene is a major obstacle to
transformative politics. The type of sociability that characterizes the established elite culture is incapable of nurturing civic duty, collective solidarity, and devotion to ideals. On the other hand, the isolation of the
shadow culture means that its institutions define themselves negatively.
Viewing themselves at war with the society, they are unable to devise
means of accommodation and dialogue between their own ideas and
those they believe dominate the society as a whole. Saddest of all, the
established elite culture and the shadow culture are both founded on the
exclusion of the masses and an inability to understand them.
The Brazilian elites have always thought of the masses in terms of
two wildly inaccurate images. On the one hand, they see the masses as
exaggerated examples of the established elites-self-indulgent, hedonistic, irresponsible, sentimental, and cynical. On the other hand, they see
them as an exaggerated version of the shadow culture-severe, implacable, and resentful. Both views rest on the elites' overwhelming ignorance
about the Brazilian masses. In contrast to the sterile, simplistic, imitative, and monotonous culture of the elites, Brazilian popular culture embraces an exciting variety of forms of sociability and moral visions.
To give an idea of the panoply of forms of social life among the
lower classes, Unger devotes much of the remainder of the discussion to
a particular cultural system. This is the system characteristic of the
northeastern and central regions of the country. It consists of four related elements: large-scale agriculture; small towns; areas of small and
medium farms and villages; and metropolitan cities, which may be physi-
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cally remote from the other three elements but have important ties to
them. The important point is that all four elements are prominent in
popular consciousness. The connection of the elements is particularly
visible in the organization of work, for example, in the situation of seasonal agricultural workers who live in the small towns and large cities
but depend on agricultural work.
In the areas of large-scale agriculture, hierarchical distinctions often
take an especially naked and brutal form, and solidarity among the workers is often weak. The largely unchecked power of the landowners and
their agents rests not only on their capacity for violence and the availability of state assistance, but on the inability of the workers to identify their
fates with this kind of production. The harshness of their lives inspires,
not resistance, but dreams of escape to family farms, small towns, or the
metropolitan city. In these circumstances, collective fights and hopes
never assume clear definition.
In turning away from the realm of large-scale agriculture, the
worker looks in two directions: toward family farms and villages and
toward the small towns. Despite their physical proximity and the ease
with which people move between them, the two represent radically opposed modes of sociability. Life in the small farm sector is characterized
by entrepreneurial pride, by norms of mutual assistance among neighbors, and by a sense of equality. It is a hard and even desperate life, but
one with traces of nobility. In comparison, small town life is mercenary
and competitive. Inequality is flaunted shamelessly and cruelly. Attitudes of conniving and demoralization overwhelm solidarity, and citizenship is degraded to parasitism. Even more than in the metropolitan
cities, a vacuous, numbing popular culture consisting largely of television
and soccer holds sway.
Unger suggests three social factors that underpin the contrast between the small farm and the town. First, in the realm of small agriculture, the relative physical separation of family farms, coupled with the
dependence of neighbors, fosters autonomy and solidarity. In the small
towns, on the other hand, where people lack space of their own and the
necessities of cooperation are weaker, people tend to view each other as
rivals and feel oppressively hemmed in by others. "In the countryside,
distance unites people; in the small towns, proximity divides them." Second, the political circumstances of small agriculture are conducive to
some measure of equality. The large landowners are unable to subjugate
the small ones but generally are able to prevent them from growing into
large ones themselves. Thus, there is a relatively stable equality in the
relations of the small producers to each other. By contrast, the economic
role of the small towns, as intermediaries between large-scale agriculture
and the metropolitan cities, generates economic circumstances that facilitate hierarchy. Third, the small operator's experience of violent oscillation between the intimacy of the relatively isolated family farm and the
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economic sufferings imposed by the outside world (the large plantations,
the towns) creates an atmosphere conducive to great hopes of collective
redemption. The precariousness of the existence of the small operator
and the elemental quality of his problems gives the small farmer a sense
of participation in a collective historical drama. On the other hand, in
the small towns, life is moderately more secure, and economic struggle is
experienced as more petty, mundane, and competitive. Here it is easier
to imagine salvation as the task of the individual soul, working against an
unchangeable world and appealing to a remote, hidden God.
The final element of the system is the metropolitan city. Here lower
class experience moves among three realities. There is the impersonal
hierarchical order of large industry, a realm of relatively secure and privileged employment. Then there is a realm of less security and more personal dependence-the realm of employment in small business, domestic
service, and odd job handiwork, and of patron-client relations with privileged aquaintances. The third reality is the disaster of unemployment
and the disintegration of personal ties. The lower classes in the metropolitan cities are buffeted among these three experiences. Each type of
existence is thus unstable: the fortunes of individuals and those to whom
they are connected fluctuate constantly.
This sketch of the diversity of popular experience in this particular
Brazilian social system is intended to illustrate three general points.
First, lower class culture is not adequately portrayed in terms of stereotypes that preoccupy the elites. Popular experience cannot be reduced to
a contrast between self-indulgence and truculence; rather it involves a
deeper dialectic of suffering, resignation, and discovery. Second, the fluctuating quality of popular experience blurs the lines of group identity,
interest, and commitment. Third, the lower classes are relatively open to
messages of collective struggle and redemption. If they are capable of
abandoning themselves to demogogic manipulation and charismatic authoritarianism (caudilhismo), they are also capable, with responsible
leadership and collective organization, of transforming the uncertainties
of the world into weapons of power and knowledge.
II.

THE TRANSFORMATIVE ALTERNATIVE

The military regime ended in 1985 in a manner that reflected the
confusion and internal division emphasized in Unger's 1979 analysis.
The regime had established a procedure by which the new president
would be elected in January 1985 by an electoral college constituted in a
manner that gave its own party a majority. But divisions within the
party intensified to the point that in the summer of 1984 the leader of the
moderate faction of the regime party bolted and entered into an alliance
with the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the
largest opposition party. The alliance pledged itself to vote for a slate
consisting of the PMDB's Tancredo Neves for president, and Jose
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Sarney, a member of the bolting wing of the party of the military regime,
for vice-president. As the year went on the alliance solidified its position.
By the time that the first articles of The Transformative Alternative appeared on December 20, it was clear that the Tancredo Neves-Sarney
slate would be elected in January.
The PMDB was one of several parties that appeared in 1980
through the political opening sponsored by the military regime, which
promised a gradual loosening of the electoral process and permitted relatively free organization of parties. It emerged through the reorganization
of what had previously been the only opposition party recognized under
the tightly controlled electoral rules. Unger was associated with the
party at the time of its reorganization and drafted its "manifesto of foundation."'6 In accordance with Brazilian electoral law, the party submitted this document to the Superior Electoral Court as part of its official
platform. (The law also requires that upon joining a party, members attest that they subsribe to the principles espoused in such documents.)
The document is in both style and substance similar to the newspaper
articles, though the dogmatic and hortatory qualities of the style are less
restrained and seem far more familiar in the context of the manifesto
form.
The manifesto emphasizes many of the central themes of The Country in a Daze: the importance but insufficiency of constitutional democracy; the need to carry democratization into the realm of private life; the
importance of decentralized popular organization; the need for economic
transformation that focuses on public support for small enterprise in the
countryside and the cities; the importance of avoiding polarization of the
organized working class and the petty bourgeoisie, and of rural and urban workers; and the possibility of a politics that attempts to transform
mundane grievances into more far-reaching critique and opposition. Especially striking in the context of the manifesto is Unger's insistence that
social change be viewed as provisional and not as a program designed to
achieve its goals once and for all: "Through democratization and mobilization, all society would become, not the fulfillment of some ultimate
destiny, but a field of experiment." '7 The manifesto outlines some of the
institutional reforms elaborated in The Transformative Alternative.
The PMDB soon moved away from the relatively radical and unconventional tenets expressed in the manifesto. The manifesto had committed the party to reach out from its centrist base within the elite to the
working class parties, labor unions, and local church-connected popular
organizations. But in practice, the party sought to conciliate centrist and
conservative groups. By the time of the electoral alliance with the mili6 R. Unger, Programa: 0 Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro E Sua Obra Futuro
(unpublished manuscript) (available in Harvard Law School Library). The manifesto has been published and widely distributed in Brazil as part of a collection of the party's electoral documents.
7 Id.
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tary party, its program and rhetoric bore little resemblance to Unger's
manifesto (despite the manifesto's continuing legal status as the party's
official platform).
Shortly after his election as president in January 1985, Tancredo
Neves died and was succeeded by Jose Sarney, the nominee of the moderate wing of the party affiliated with the military regime. It is not clear
that this change had any significant effect on the programmatic direction
of the PMDB. Certainly Unger felt that the programmatic shift away
from the principles of the manifesto had occurred earlier.
Thus, while The Transformative Alternative elaborates on the program of the PMDB manifesto, it was written in opposition to the PMDB
as it had evolved by the time of the 1985 elections. The program to
which it is an "alternative" is explicitly that of the Tancredo Neves
administration.
By this time Unger had become associated with the Democratic
Workers' Party and its leader Leonel Brizola, a major figure in the Goulart regime who had recently returned from exile. A leftist populist-style
leader, Brizola was one of the few Brazilian politicians with anything like
a mass following and was probably the most popular. He was widely
regarded among the elites as a demogogue and was the political figure
most feared by members of the military regime.
The TransformativeAlternative begins with a prediction that the imminent PMDB regime would frustrate the hopes of the middle and working classes and would fail to vindicate the ideals of political democracy.
Unger describes the fundamental characteristics of this program as a desire to alleviate the grossly unequal distribution of income in Brazil without confronting entrenched economic privilege. This "redistributive but
institutionally conservative" 8 program is committed to welfare measures
and an income policy but does not propose to alter the productive structure of the economy. Unger argues that this program is bound to fail and
that without fundamental institutional change, redistribution will impede
growth and productivity.
Unger argues that the PMDB constitutional rhetoric has also taken
a conservative direction. The party leaders have begun to balk at the
notion of contested direct elections and to flirt with the idea of "democracy by acclamation." 9 They suggest that contested elections may be a
luxury inappropriate to unstable times and that rallies, opinion polls, and
plebiscites might adequately replace contested elections. Gradually becoming explicit in this rhetoric is a conservative constitutional project.
One of its themes is an effort to combine presidential and parliamentary
models in a way that restrains the aspects of presidentialism considered
dangerous, which is to say, anti-elitist. These are the aspects that permit
8 0 Problema e a Tarefa, supra note 3.
9 Id.
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popular leaders to appeal directly to the masses over the heads of the
party oligarchs and local interests. The other theme of the project is
corporatism: social groups organized under the control of the state
would be accorded representation in the decisional processes of the government. For example, labor and management representatives would
have more or less official representatives in the economic planning
process.
Unger argues that Brazil needs a constitutional regime exactly the
opposite of this. Instead of a chastened presidencialismo,it needs a regime that retains the power of the president to appeal directly to the
people, while adding measures that avoid the institutional stalemates that
characterize presidential regimes. Instead of a conciliating, tutelary corporatism, it needs a system that fosters popular self-organization while
emancipating it from the state.
The turning away of the PMDB from the concerns of the lower
classes and from institutional innovation favors more contentious leaders
capable of giving voice to popular discontents. But Unger acknpwledges
a danger here: that of repeating "the recurrent drama of contemporary
Brazilian politics." 10 A tumultuous and confused populism could antagonize the middle classes and provoke the military to re-assume power.
The risk seems particularly great because the process of redemocratization is occurring without any clear affirmation of the principle of civilian
rule and without the institutional reforms necessary to it. Unger attributes this danger to the populist style associated in Brazil with Getulio
Vargas, who ruled from 1930 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1954, first as a
usurping dictator and then as a popularly elected president, and which
many now attribute-not entirely without reason, Unger admits-to Leonel Brizola. This style, which emphasizes welfare spending and direct
personal appeals to the masses by charismatic leaders, is ultimately ineffectual, first, because it neglects the tasks of mass organization and thus
makes itself vulnerable to coups, and second, because it neglects the tasks
of economic reform and thus makes itself vulnerable to inflation and
disinvestment.
At the level of party politics, Unger sees three broad groups. The
group of conservative development is committed to keeping things more
or less as they are and responding to popular deprivation indirectly
through general economic growth. The redistributive group (to which,
Unger says, the leaders of the PMDB would belong if redistribution did
not require taking away from some as well as giving to others) is committed to redistributing wealth and income within existing structures
through fiscal, income, and welfare policy. Lastly, the group committed
to institutional transformation includes the "independent leftists" of the
PMDB, the Democratic Workers' Party, and the Workers' Party.
10 A Estrategia Politicado Transicao, supra note 3.
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None of the parties of the left has yet acquired a mass base. But the
popular mobilization in the last years of the military regime, especially
by labor unions and local church-affiliated groups, provides important
opportunities. Unger insists that the Brazilian left is distinguished from
the center at both the party and the popular levels, not by a commitment
to statism over privatism, but rather by a preference for a more egalitarian, experimental, and participatory mode of decentralizing the economy than the dominant private rights model of Western political
economy. A striking and paradoxical quality of the recent popular labor
and ecclesiastical movements has been precisely that they express an aspiration to radically democratize the society in the language of socialism
at the same time that they reject statism, the talisman of traditional socialist movements. So far, these aspirations remain vaguely formulated.
Unger offers his program as a contribution to the effort to give concrete
content to them.
Unger argues that the success of a more ambitious project of transformation depends on the willingness and ability of the Tancredo NevesSarney government to secure basic legal and economic rights, rights of
organization, and welfare rights that alleviate the kind of severe misery
that leaves people more prostrate than indignant. Thus, the independent
leftists within the PMDB government have an important role to play in
insuring that the government keeps its commitment to basic political liberties and economic rights. Unger doubts, however, that they can move
their party very far to the left. He thinks that the electorate will so rapidly identify the party with the more conservative path it has charted that
the party will compromise its ability to deepen its program.
The "independent" quarters of the PMDB, the Workers' Party, and
Democratic Workers' Party are likely to contribute to the project of developing the organizational and programmatic bases for a more ambitious politics. But for the moment, those within the PMDB seem
paralyzed by ambivalence about their relation to the party. And the
Workers' Party has a social base-the radicalized sectors of the salaried
middle classes and factory workers in the industrialized areas-and a
doctrinal perspective-one that puts the conquest of the state before the
transformation of society-that make it difficult for the party to perform
the critical tasks of organizing the masses outside the industrial sector
and of conciliating among the different political groups committed to
transformative politics.
Leonel Brizola and the Democratic Workers' Party, which have a
following among the unorganized workers and are less committed to the
traditional preconceptions of socialist politics, seem better situated to undertake these tasks. To do so, however, they need to develop a concrete
program of non-statist socialism, and they need to develop internal
processes that are more impersonal, complex, and pluralist. At the same
time, the independent leftists within other parties need to develop a fairer

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
appreciation of labor history, of the phenomenon of popular leadership,
and of Brizola himself.
In four articles of the series, Unger sketches the economic dimension of his program, and in the following six, he sketches the political
dimension. Another article discusses the reform of the military, and the
final one discusses "the politics of personal relations."
A.

Economic Change

The sketch of Unger's economic program begins by rejecting two
assumptions shared by the dominant currents on both the left and the
right. The first assumption is that prosperity requires that development
continue to focus on concentrated, large-scale industry. The second concerns the understanding of the meaning of decentralization adopted from
liberal political economy-one which identifies centralization with government control of the economy and decentralization with private property rights. Unger's program proposes state interventions designed to
foster decentralization and challenges some of the aspects of private
property rights that in fact promote centralization, notably the control
exercised by a small number of large-scale institutions in the name of
property investment and capital.
Despite his emphasis on fundamental institutional change, Unger
expresses some sympathy for those who say that the new government
must attend to the most urgent economic problems in incremental fashion, and only turn to basic reform when immediate pressures abate. He
does not deny this point, but rather argues that there are many possible
incremental responses to immediate problems, and that some have more
potential than others to contribute to further, more basic change.
The economic program has two stages. The first involves the creation of a partnership between the state and small enterprise. The idea is
most readily illustrated in the agricultural sector, where programs in the
United States and other advanced countries have attempted, albeit ambivalently and with mixed success, to support small enterprises through
the provision of services and resources designed to compensate for the
disadvantages of scale. Thus, through price regulation, favorable tax policies, and access to credit, the government makes small farmers less vulnerable to the market. It helps small producers take advantage of some
scale economies without growing by providing technical assistance and
by assisting in the organization and financing of cooperative marketing
and development projects. Such a policy in Brazil would constitute a
reversal of the longstanding practice of public subsidy and assistance to
large-scale enterprise. Recently published data indicate that agricultural
establishments of less than one hundred hectares account for twenty percent of the agricultural land in Brazil and receive thirty-four percent of
agricultural finance but are responsible for fifty percent of agricultural
production, while enterprises larger than one hundred hectares account
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for eighty percent of the land, receive sixty-six percent of finance, and
contribute less than half of agricultural production. The most immediate
victims of the established policies, and the potential beneficiaries of the
proposed reform, are the underemployed and impoverished masses in the
large cities, most of whom have emigrated from the countryside for lack
of employment.
Though the model of state support for small enterprise is less familiar in the industrial sector, it could be extended there. For example,
instead of nationalizing the banks or continuing to leave small entrepreneurs at the mercy of banks who invariably prefer large clients, the government would organize an alternative financial system designed to
support small enterprise. It would organize industrial parks, even in areas already highly industrialized, that would provide technical and
mechanical support to participants that would enable them to take advantage of technology with high minimum fixed costs while remaining
small and would encourage experiments with cooperative and participatory work organization.
The point is not to abolish all forms of economic concentration in
either agriculture or industry, but to divert the emphasis of economic
policy from its traditional subservience to large-scale organization. Even
a modest shift in emphasis, if shrewdly managed and complemented by
popular political organization, could have revolutionary consequences
for economic development and social equality.
One of the economic consequences would be to increase the productivity of the parts of the economy-rural and urban small enterprisesthat employ the great majority of the Brazilian workforce. Instead of
relying on the radiating effects from a nucleus of concentrated industry,
which will never employ more than a small percentage of the work force,
the policy would open to previously excluded masses of workers opportunities to participate in the central and dynamic mainstream of the economy. And it would enable Brazil to avoid playing the role being
designed for the more advanced Third World countries by the dominant
trends in the international division of labor-that of serving as a base for
the kind of concentrated and bureaucratic industrial organization that
the wealthy Western countries have already started to abandon.
The program would contribute to social equality by increasing employment and income. The increased purchasing power of the lower and
middle strata would push industry to re-orient production toward popular consumption and away from its present focus on consumer durables,
such as automobiles and appliances, that in Brazil are upper class
luxuries.
However successful, this preliminary stage will be self-limiting. The
limit will occur when the problem of radical inequality re-asserts itself
among the newly developed businesses. The more successful will grow
large; the less successful will try to hang on by pleading for increased
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state support. At this point a second stage of more fundamental reform
becomes appropriate. The second stage involves the "revolving capital
fund" program advanced in Politics. In this program, the government
would establish broad parameters over such matters as the level of savings and investment and the permissible degrees of economic inequality.
Below the government but substantially independent of it would be a
series of investment funds. Each fund would specialize in a defined area
of the economy and different kinds of investment, but the funds would
overlap sufficiently to permit competition among them. The funds would
make capital available strictly on a temporary and conditional basis.
Some funds would be allocated through rationing; others through auction. Under rationing, funds would be lent subject to extensive conditions restricting the organization and activities of the recipients. The
rationing criteria would give preference to the creation of new businesses
rather than the expansion of established ones. Eligibility would be restricted to groups of workers committed to specified norms of democratic
work organization. The recipients would pay interest to the fund, a portion of which would be remitted to the central government. Favoritism
in allocating resources would be constrained in part by competition
among the funds to achieve the highest possible returns within the rationing constraints.
The other funds would hold capital permanently at auction. Whenever new bidders demonstrate an ability to earn a higher return on resources than the current holders, the capital would pass to the new
bidders. The prior holders would be compensated by a program of displacement benefits.
At the enterprise level, the program contemplates a broad range of
autonomy in the organization and operation of businesses, especially in
those funded by auctioned funds. Instead of having rights in a particular
job in a particular industry-a kind of privilege that paralyzes social and
personal innovation-workers would benefit from a permanent retraining system. And they will be secure against impoverishment through a
welfare system financed by interest payments to the capital funds.
Unger argues that, while this program would diminish the sovereign
character of property rights in capitalist economies, it would decentralize
the economy. It would do so by divorcing the ability to take advantage
of scale economies from the control of large concentrations of capital.
The economic discussion ends with an emphatic repudiation of
many of the established practices of Brazilian public finance. It rejects
the practices of redistributing through the manipulation of foreign currency exchange (as by overvaluing the national currency and then rationing foreign currency at the implicitly subsidized rates to favored users).
The program would hold the state to strict standards of fiscal efficiency
and responsibility. It would reject uncontrolled monetary expansion that
feeds inflation and pushes up real tax rates. The program would also
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dispense with the practice of generalized salary adjustments unrelated to
increased changes in productivity. It would address the salary question
by refocusing investment so as to increase the relative productivity of the
lower classes.
One of the aims of the program would be to combat financial speculation, which has assumed economically disastrous and humiliating proportions in the Brazilian economy. The program would sell public
securities directly to individual savers rather than institutions, would
prohibit their use as security for private borrowing, would require the
banking system to internalize the financing of interbank transactions
without state subsidy, would apply aggressive antitrust legislation to the
banks, and would tax gains from speculative transactions at exceptionally
high rates.
With respect to Brazil's high foreign debt, the program would seek
creditor forbearance, but it would treat forbearance as space in which to
pursue institutional reconstruction, not as a license to redistribute as
much as possible before the ax falls.
Unger concludes by stating that, while he prefers redistribution
through institutional reconstruction to redistribution through transfer
payments, he recognizes the need for some transfers. On the other hand,
his program would repudiate "at any cost" the type of redistribution favored by recent Brazilian governments that relies on hidden subsidies,
currency manipulation, monetary magic, and featherbedding public
employment.
B.

The Constitution

The six pieces in the series sketching the constitutional aspects of
the program were offered as proposals for the Constituent Assembly
which was then planned and, subsequently in 1986, elected and convened
to draft a new constitution for Brazil. Unger prefaces the constitutional
discussion with two warnings. The first is that the temptation to view the
new constitution as a means of establishing once and for all a permanent
model of social organization imposing the policies and principles of the
drafters on future generations should be resisted. The task, rather,
should be seen as laying ground rules for a process of "permanent innovation." The critical precondition for such a process is preventing the
possibility that any particular class or faction assumes dominant power.
Unger asserts that this view does not mean that the constitution should
be brief or dry. He rejects the suggestion that the American Constitution
should be taken as a model. Neither the concision nor the long duration
of the American Constitution, so widely admired in many quarters, are
necessarily virtues from the point of view of the ideal of permanent social
innovation.
The second caution stresses the importance of achieving a realistic
understanding of the relation between constitutional thought and the
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claims of organized social movements. This requires taking account of
some lessons of the Brazilian experience. When the institutions of the
liberal democratic state are projected into circumstances of extreme inequality and unabashed elitism like those in Brazil, they suffer two perversions. In the poorer and more submissive areas of the country, they
become mired in clientalism. In the more politicized areas of the country, these institutions confront a level of expectation and agitation, either
from organized movements or more frequently from populist leaders
speaking for disorganized masses, that they are unable to canalize or
absorb.
It is said that these perversions would disappear with the achievement of greater equality. But the institutions Brazil has received from
the Western liberal democratic tradition, instead of being part of the solution, are part of the problem. They make frequent far-reaching reform
difficult by deploying an array of constitutional obstacles. At the same
time, these institutions leave popular organizations without support or,
as with the corporatist variations of liberalism, with the kind of support
that crushes them.
This should not be surprising. The constitutionalism of the liberal
democratic state, so readily identified as the natural essence of democracy, is in fact the contingent product of heterogeneous events and circumstances. One such circumstance is the type of political party-more
than a mere alliance of professional politicians but less than a real mass
organization-that took root in the early democracies in the nineteenth
century. Another is the set of constitutional techniques, such as the
classical scheme of the separation and balance of powers in the presidential regime, designed to restrict officials in a way that also rigidifies the
social order, protecting it from agitations and agitators and conserving
power in the hands of social elites.
Brazil needs new constitutional ideas and institutions in order to
break the vicious cycle of its politics. It cannot attain or surpass the level
of freedom and equality of the wealthy foreign democracies by imitating
their political systems. To do so would perpetuate the pattern of clientalistic appropriation of the state, followed by extra-institutional mobilization, followed by impasse, and ultimately, by regime failure. Brazil needs
a constitution that will foster a more flexible state, a more mobilized society, and a more contentious culture than those of the countries to which
it looks for its models.
The constitutional program Unger proposes in response to these
concerns emphasizes five features: first, a reformed presidential regime;
second, the transformation of public administration; third, a set of norms
and institutions that foster "self-organization" in workplaces and residential communities; fourth, a revised understanding of federalism; and
fifth, a set of norms and institutions designed to impede and destabilize
concentrations of power.
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Unger embraces a strong, directly elected presidency in preference
to the parliamentary models popular among the elites, not on the ground
that it is intrinsically superior, but on the ground that presidential elections in Brazil traditionally have been privileged occasions of political
mobilization that have anguished the elites and confounded their calculations. A strong presidential regime has the most promise of canalizing
the energies for reform against the blocking efforts of the elites.
Unger rejects the complaints being advanced against "presidencialismo." The critics assert that presidential regimes produce omnipotent
and repressive executives. Unger replies that some parliamentary regimes, such as England's, and to a lesser extent India's, have produced
chief executives as strong as any in the world. Moreover, in Brazil, presidents have tended to be strong only in their capacity to give out favors;
they have been weak in their capacity to execute the reform programs to
which they have committed themselves. The former problem requires
reforms that restrict particular kinds of presidential power, but the latter
requires reforms that extend presidential power.
Another complaint is that the presidential regime provokes periodic
political crises. But to an important extent, the "crises" are nothing
more than reflections of the threat that presidential elections have represented to elite political control. The constitution should preserve this
threat. It should protect the continuity of basic democratic commitments by strengthening the means for presidents to fulfill their electoral
commitments and by safeguarding basic political rights, especially those
of popular organization.
The critics also say that presidential regimes excessively personalize
politics. But in a country where political leaders are accustomed to ideological posturing, a focus on personalities is not entirely a disadvantage.
The emphasis on personalities often involves an effort to assess the real
intentions of the candidates, so often hidden behind the misdirections
and prevarications of campaign rhetoric.
Nevertheless, the classical presidential regime does suffer from a basic defect: a tendency toward impasse between a popularly elected president and a parliamentary opposition majority. This tendency is
particularly severe in connection with efforts at fundamental reform.
Brazil is a country in which the citizenry has been generally oppressed
and has acheived freedom only when and to the extent that it has mobilized. And it is a country in which popular forces can gain the presidency more easily than they can achieve a legislative majority. In such
circumstances, a tendency to impasse is fatal. It fuels the frustrating cycle of modern Brazilian politics: a centrist president ... disillusionment
of the working class electorate ... a left-wing president ... a congress
opposed to presidential reforms ... popular mobilization in support of
the president ... reaction, coup, and collapse of the democratic regime
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... redemocratization... vacillations of chastened liberals.., a centrist
president ....
It's time to put an end to this recurring history.
The solution is to reform the presidential regime to cure it of its
tendency to impasse. This requires a means of quickly referring the basic
disputes to the electorate in a way that facilitates both the resolution of
basic issues and the replacement of the personnel identified with the rejected alternative so as to make possible governmental unity. The result
might be viewed as a synthesis of parliamentary and presidential models,
though it is radically opposed to the style of parliamentarism favored by
conservative jurists in Brazil.
In this model, the congress would be empowered to dismiss the president within, say, a year of election for political or programmatic reasons.
The dismissal of the president would trigger new elections for both the
congress and the presidency. For his part, the president would be
obliged to submit to the congress at the beginning of each session a reform plan setting out the general outlines of his program. Should the
congress reject the program, the president could dissolve the congress
and call new congressional elections. But the president could invoke this
power a second time only by simultaneously triggering a presidential
election for which he would be ineligible. The president would not be
permitted to legislate by decree during the interval between the dissolution of the congress and the election of a new one.
This system of mutual dissolution and substitution of powers would
also make liberal use of referenda, initiatives, and plebiscites. These techniques do not represent within the framework proposed here what they
might elsewhere: an invitation to a popular leader to appeal to the people over the heads of constitutional institutions without modifying those
institutions, and in effect to conduct a kind of permanent coup d'dtat.
A presidential regime reformed along these lines would have two
basic virtues. It would contribute to a politics that repeatedly mobilizes
the society to question its basic structure. And it would give the victorious party an opportunity to implement a program of basic reform.
The next feature of the constitutional reform confronts the features
of the Brazilian state that make it a powerful instrument for handing out
favors and punishments but a weak one for reforming society. At first
glance, this situation might seem an irresolvable paradox; the state's
power to affect society might seem to lie precisely in its capacity to dispense and withhold myriad forms of patronage. But this is a mistake. In
fact, precisely the same factors that cause the state's hypertrophy as patron are responsible for its impotence as reformer.
The first of these causes is irresponsible functionalism. Elected officials control appointments to not only upper level government positions
involving policy formulation, but also a vast and poorly defined array of
middle level offices. The consequence is to place between policy level
officials and the professional civil service an undisciplined and incompe-
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tent horde of friends of friends of the powerful. Meddlesome and politically unaccountable, this group, which is occupied largely with matters
of patronage and profiteering, impedes the execution of any government
program. The problem would be alleviated by ending the practice of patronage appointments below the policy level. More difficult but also necessary is the definition of ideas and the cultivation of attitudes that
promote and distinguish the political responsibility of policy officials on
the one hand and ministerial responsibility of civil servants on the other.
Another aspect of the dilemma is the corporatist practice that pervades Brazilian public administration. It is exemplified by the "mixed
commissions"-official bodies with jurisdiction over some area of policy
whose membership is composed in substantial part of representatives of
interested private groups. The use of such practices to extend citizen
representation within the state has striking defects. On the one hand, it
facilitates the control by the state of the represented private groups; on
the other hand, it permits the more powerful private groups to capture
for their own benefit the public regulatory power they are supposed to be
supervising. At the same time, this form of administration impedes the
formulation and implementation of a coherent governmental program by
the central government. It tends to dissolve government policy into a
series of small private deals. The proper response to this situation is to
purge public administration of all vestiges of corporatism. The state
should try to strengthen popular organization in the ways discussed below, but it should stop doing so by according official executive status to
the strongest private organized groups.
Still another dimension of the administrative problem is the proclivity for hidden and indirect redistribution through subsidies, unequal indexing for inflation, discriminatory price and foreign currency controls,
and public job creation exempt from norms of productive efficiency and
financial responsibility. Besides allowing perverse forms of redistribution
that would be unacceptable if done explicitly and directly, this proclivity
aggravates the dilemma of public administration. Indirect redistributive
practices encourage an endless line of favor-seeking that distracts and
encumbers the executive. It also permits the governing potential of the
executive to be cannibalized by private interests and encourages particularistic solutions to broad social problems. The appropriate response is
to ban hidden and indirect redistribution.
To create a state weak in its ability to hand out favors but strong in
its ability to execute reforms, Brazil must dismantle the patronage state,
which stagnates reform by the same means that it infantalizes and corrupts its citizens.
The third aspect of the constitutional program concerns the principles and instruments of citizen self-organization. The program contemplates the development of practices currently established in labor
organizations and their extension to other areas of social life.
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All discussions in Brazil of labor organization begin by rejecting the
established system of corporatism; a system that, under the pretext of
making unions part of the state, subordinates them to the state. But the
rejection of corporatism should not lead to the embrace of pluralism,
which permits rival unions to compete to represent the same groups of
workers. On the one hand, pluralism dissipates the energies of the labor
movement in internal fighting. On the other hand, it radically separates
the union's confrontation with the employer from its confrontation with
the state. In any case, pluralism favors a moderate level and an
economistic style of labor militancy.
In the hands of an authoritarian government, a unitary union system serves as a means of repression, especially in combination with the
weapons of political control that a corporatist system furnishes the government. But in the circumstances of developed democracy, unity has
the opposite effect. It facilitates politicized union militancy, politicized
in the sense of linking economistic claims to claims of institutional
reform.
Unger proposes a union structure that combines unity with autonomy. As in the current system, the state would define a structure that
would include a single representative organization for each group of
workers. Different currents of opinion, whether or not linked to political
parties, could compete for influence in these organizations, in much the
same way that political parties compete for offices in the state. The two
competing national labor organizations in Brazil today, which are not
part of the official state-mandated structure, illustrate how competition
can operate within a single-union structure. Without being part of the
legal structure, they give organizational expression to the different currents of opinions among the workers and link the legally mandated union
structure to the national political parties. Such organizations complement the official centralized organization that forms a part of the legally
mandated structure.
Whether or not a system of state mandated unitary unions can be
reconciled with genuine autonomy for these unions depends on the resolution of a series of concrete problems. For example, there is the issue of
the classification of workers for the purpose of determining the scope of
the bottom tier representative organizations. A unitary system requires a
single set of classifications. But unitary classification does not necessarily
mean classification by the state. An initial classification by the Ministry
of Labor could be a provisional one subject to modification when a majority of the affected workers voted for a particular reclassification.
Another matter that raises the issue of the reconciliation of unity
and autonomy is the labor tax, which under the established Brazilian
corporatist regime the state collects from employers and returns to the
unions to fund organizational expenses. It is not inevitable that the labor
tax lead to oppression and corruption. But to avoid this, a series of re-
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forms is essential. The majority of the receipts should remain in the
hands of the base level union organizations. The system should be organized on the model of public political campaign finance systems, so that
funds are available to finance competitors in contested union elections.
The tax should be scaled to fall more heavily on capital-intensive enterprise so that it does not act as a disincentive to employment. Unions
should be most generously funded in those sectors of the economy that
can most easily isolate themselves from union pressures.
To the extent that the democratization of the economy proceeded
along the lines proposed above, especially in terms of support for small
enterprise, the unions might acquire new functions, not so much in terms
of representing employees against employers, but in terms of representing
the interests and aspirations of small entrepreneurs vis-a-vis the state.
Alongside the unions, a system of neighborhood organizations
should be established. These organizations would act as a kind of
counter-state, facilitating local political participation and competing with
the municipal councils, not with respect to their legislative powers, but
with respect to identifying problems and organizing pressures for change.
These neighborhood organizations might in turn affiliate with any of a
variety of national political organizations. No legal structure would be
prescribed for the national organizations; they could adopt whatever
structure seemed appropriate to their program.
The constitutional program also addresses the issue of decentralization. Legislative and administrative decentralization is widely favored in
Brazilian political debate. Unger emphasizes that, from the left's point of
view, decentralization as conventionally conceived would be dangerous.
It could strengthen local oligarchies by immunizing them from political
struggles that arise more readily at the national level. If centralized
power has often taken the side of the wealthy and powerful, it has also
been the only agency capable of threatening them and of opening space
for transformative politics.
Unger proposes an approach to decentralization in which the national government permits and even encourages state and local legislative
initiative but retains responsibility to guarantee that such initiative is not
used to create or strengthen inequality and dependence. State and local
initiative would be facilitated through a general doctrine of concurrent
legislation that would 'permit governments to opt out of federal legislation in certain areas and through specific federal delegations of legislative
power in other areas. Safeguards against the abuse of decentralized
power would be enforced through federal judicial review of state and local concurrent legislation or legislation under specific delegations,
through legislative revocations of improperly used delegations, and
through citizen exercise of "destabilization rights."
The proposal for "destabilization rights" begins with a criticism of
the dominant tendency of thought among Brazilian social democrats
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about constitutional rights. This tendency is to focus on guarantees of
material welfare and to give little attention to guarantees of distribution
of power. Unger argues that it is unlikely that constitutional welfare
rights could ever be formulated so as to be effectively enforceable. On
the one hand, if the rights were vaguely defined, almost any government
program would survive review under them; on the other hand, if they
were specifically defined, they would deprive the government of needed
flexiblity to respond to economic contingency.
Rather than focus on guarantees of material welfare, Unger would
focus on guarantees of opportunities to mount political resistance to perceived violations of substantive political values, including welfare rights.
These guarantees include rights of free expression and of political organization. Most distinctively, they include destabilization rights: rights to
provoke, through appeal to a fourth branch of government, the
destabilization and reconstruction of organizations and practices whose
structure of authority or membership conflicts with the minimal exigencies of the democratic order and which have become immune to the normal forms of electoral challenge. The practice or organization might be a
way of organizing work or of assigning students to schools or providing
treatment in hospitals or asylums. It might be a usurpation of decisional
power. It might be an exclusion that victimizes women or minorities.
The constitutional program could provide, not only to the individuals and groups directly affected, but to any citizen, a right of action. If
sustained, the claim would warrant intervention by the state to provide
minimal conditions of dignity and autonomy to those oppressed by the
challenged organization or practice. The enforcement of destabilization
rights is a distinct activity separate from legislative and judicial functions
and it should be confined to a distinct branch of government. This could
take the form of a council composed of some members elected directly,
the President of the Republic, and perhaps members appointed by the
other branches.
Although these new rights and their distinctive enforcement mechanism may appear radically innovative, they merely generalize solutions
already accepted under different names and in more truncated forms, in
several contemporary democracies.
C. The Military
All discussions of progressive reform in Brazil are haunted by a
vague but pervasive fear of military veto. This is a condition intolerable
to any democratic program, and thus Unger's program includes proposals for reforming the military.
Unger begins by observing that there is no plausible strategic role
for the Brazilian military as it is presently organized. On the one hand, it
is not and could never become strong enough to engage in war with a
nuclear power, and it is not organized to conduct the kind of guerilla
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warfare that would be needed against an occupying great power. On the
other hand, it is vastly larger than necessary to counter any plausible
threat of invasion from a neighboring country.
Moreover, the military regime actually weakened the fighting capacities of the military. It left Brazil and its army divided internally between
an arrogant semihereditary officer caste and a miserable, untrained, and
immature rank-and-file. Far from being capable of the operational and
technological flexibility modem warfare requires, the army's commanders seem to have been preparing to refight the Battle of Verdun in
southern Brazil. The troops have been demoralized by their subordination to the domestic security unit during the military regime and corrupted by the use of the military career as a springboard to privileged
state and private employment. Unger sketches a plan designed to make
the military less prepared for domestic political intervention but more
prepared for military combat.
The plan distinguishes between a "social-military service" and a
"military center." The social military service would conscript young
men and women for obligatory national service at the time they finished
their studies. Part of their service would involve social projects, such as
constructing schools, hospitals, irrigation and land reclamation projects,
as well as providing educational, medical, and legal services. At the
same time, they would undergo basic military training, and would go on
after their period of full-time service to become reservists. The emphasis
would be on general skills adaptable to a variety of circumstances and a
changing military technology.
Inductees would be conscripted in the opposite order from that of
the present system: the most educated people would come first; then the
relatively less educated but only to the extent the system was prepared to
provide them with significant education within the social-military service. The more educated recruits would share the more humble work
with the less educated. Thus the armed forces would come closer to the
image of a Brazil without social classes that those forces, in their best
moments, have wanted to realize. The children of the elites would be
required to serve and would thus be exposed to the darker side of Brazil.
The military center would be a separate organization. It would be a
vanguard of highly trained officers, responsible for the development of a
repertory of technological and organizational capacities and strategic
conceptions. It would serve two purposes, which would have a variety of
peaceful applications, taking advantage of the links between military and
civilian technology. In this way, the system would continue the polytechnic tradition of the Brazilian officer corps. At the same time, the
military center would supervise the military training and availability for
combat of the recruits and reservists of the social-military service.
The military center would not have effective control over the troops
of the social-military service. The latter would be organized in decentral-
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ized fashion and would have its own administrative officer corps which
would not be a self-perpetuating elite. The goal of organization would be
to enhance national security while at the same time to eliminate the possibility of a domestic military veto of political initiatives.
D.

The Politics of PersonalRelations

The last piece in the series argues that political transformation
should involve, not only institutional change, but the self-conscious remaking of the tones and patterns of personal relations.
Unger suggests that the most distinctive characteristic of the Brazilian ideal of human relations lies in the obscure link between two tendencies that, at first glance, appear contradictory. One of these tendencies is
the commitment to delicacy and softness in personal encounters and the
conviction that immediate personal solidarity is more important than abstract differences of principle. The other tendency is the exaltation of an
ideal of grandeur in personal style, a devotion to the grandiose, the excessive, and the impulsive qualities that enliven conventions and routines
and that mirror on the plane of human encounters the unconstrained,
superabundant qualities of nature. Thus, many of the major figures of
Brazilian high literary culture juxtapose a fascination for spontaneous
and disorderly vitality with the sober irony of decline, limitations, and
frustration.
The most original mark of Brazilian culture is this conviction that
there is a mode of self-affirmation that strengthens sensitivity and solidarity, rather than subverting them-that there is a way of being at once
sweet and great. This ambition is distinctive within Western culture,
where Christian paths of charity have often seemed incompatible with
pagan ideals of grandeur.
But this distinctive vision is degraded by a variety of forces in Brazilian life. In contrast to the ideal that they undermine, these forces are
not specifically Brazilian; they oppress the cultures of many subjugated
peoples.
There is, first of all, the sentimentalization of power. The relations
of exchange and work in Brazil are also relations of domination and dependence. These ties, at once contractual and hierarchical, become tolerable by sentiments of mutual loyalty that temper the force of fear and
interest. In this situation, every show of tenderness risks turning into
servility. And every rebellion appears to be a betrayal of venerable loyalties. Women, who are the major carriers of the distinctive aspects of
Brazilian culture, are also the major victims of this confusion between
sentiment and power. Thus, in Brazil the feminist movement is necessarily implicated in the attempt to desentimentalize power.
Then there is the dialectic of bureaucracy and paternalism. The omnipresence of paternalism leads to the imposition of rigid rules and centralized administration to protect people from extreme personal
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subjugation. But bureaucratization multiplies inefficiency and generates
distrust. To make things work, it is necessary to reintroduce discretion,
which reintroduces favoritism and paternalism. If the Czarist regime
could be characterized as despotism tempered by assassination, the practice of personal relations in Brazil could be called bureaucracy tempered
by patronage. For those who do not have patrons, or who do not want
them, the solution is to fight for a style of relationship that is both more
informal and more impersonal. But without paternalism, informality requires trust. And trust requires a minimum of autonomy and equality.
People who do not know each other, or even who are not connected
by previously defined relations, tend to be indifferent and even brutal
toward each other. Anyone who has driven an automobile in any of the
large cities in Brazil knows this. This lack of civility among strangers
arises from a difficulty in imagining other people as real and deserving of
respect, which is in turn a function of a social structure of hierarchy and
exclusion.
Institutional change is necessary to change these traits. But it is also
necessary to practice an extra-institutional politics of personal relations
in the places where people live and work: in schools, factories, and
neighborhoods. It is necessary to develop more informal styles of sociability and conditions of trust through small-scale confrontation and experimentation. Everyday realities have to be changed through everyday
practices. Only through such experimentation can Brazilian culture approach its ideal of becoming at once both sweet and great.
By 1987 the emphasis of The TransformativeAlternative on the dangers and limits of institutionally conservative redistribution seemed prescient. As expected, the Sarney government committed itself to modest
redistributive efforts and rejected ambitious institutional reform. It soon
faced triple-digit inflation and declining investment, both aggravated by
the pressures of a huge international debt burden. In early 1986 it responded with the Cruzado plan, a series of economic reforms including a
new currency, temporary wage and price controls, various steps toward
the de-indexation of the economy, and promises of responsible fiscal and
monetary policies.
The plan was portrayed as a means of preserving the purchasing
power of the wage earners, though Unger argued in the Folha that the
wage controls were structured so that workers lost ground. 1 The plan
had an initial success in spurring growth and arresting inflation and generated a wave of popularity for the administration. Riding this wave and
looking toward the November 1986 elections, the administration mainI Unger, 0 Piano de Estabilizacao-Un Golpe Branco Contra Os Trabahladores [The Stabilization Plan-A Conservative Coup Against the Workers], Folha de Sao Paulo, Mar. 18, 1986
(Opinao), at 3.
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tained price controls long after its economists thought appropriate, and it
broke its promise of responsible monetary policy.
In consequence, the price controls discouraged production, buyers
went on a purchasing binge that depleted inventories and then turned to
imports until the country's foreign exchange reserves gave out. The administration's policy held until just after the November 15 elections, in
which Sarney and his electoral alliance enjoyed a sweeping triumph. But
almost immediately afterwards, shortages and investment declines became striking, and triple-digit inflation re-ignited. The administration
was forced to relax price controls and fall back on indexing. Antigovernment street demonstration and strikes became frequent.
Thus, more than two years after its publication, the account in The
Transformative Aterative of the dilemmas of centrist reform seemed as
timely as ever.
III.

CONCLUSION

Politics and Unger's journalism share a concern about the relation of
the modernist critique of established and conventional thought with prescriptive and programmatic thought. In legal and moral discourse, Unger's style of modernist critique tries to show that the conclusions of
conventional discourse do not follow from their premises or that the
premises yield several, sometimes contradictory conclusions. In social
theory, the critique attacks claims that events are necessarily linked in
rigid sequences or that social circumstances combine in only a small
number of patterns.
This style of critique seems to pose difficulties for programmatic argument, since any programmatic argument is vulnerable to the critical
methods modernists apply to conventional thought. The modernists
themselves have shown that there is no such thing as a discourse without
premises and presuppositions; yet critique can always show that prescriptive conclusions are not rigorously or uncontroversially grounded in their
premises or that the premises themselves are controversial. At the most
extreme, this recognition has led modernists to deny or abandon prescriptive thought entirely or to adopt a nihilist or avant-gardist style that
12
attempts to escape criticism by making a principle of arbitrariness.
Unger rejects these more extreme moral claims of modernism. Unlike his first work, Knowledge and Politics, his more recent work does not
aspire to a "total criticism"' 3 that would encompass and transcend the
most basic premises of the dominant modes of thought. It insists on the
impossibility of entirely transcending the influence of the established conventions of thought and culture, while denying the necessity of surrender
12 See, e.g., Sontag, The Aesthetics of Silence, in STYLES OF RADICAL WILL 1-34 (1969); Luban,
Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656 (1987).
13 KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS at 1-3.
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to them. The style of argument in the journalism is one Unger has called
"internal development" and "deviationist doctrine" 14 elsewhere, and one
he defends at length in Politics as a combination of "internal" and "vi15
sionary" argument.
Unger acknowledges that this style of programmatic discourse involves an irreducible element of will, but he argues that it also involves a
style of meaningful argument and analysis involving the "mutual correction of abstract ideals and their institutional realizations." 16 The society's institutions are criticized in the light of its ideals, and its ideals are
revised in the light of its experience with institutions. The practice is
internal in the sense that it makes use of the established conventions of
normative argument; it is visionary in the sense that it appeals to the
more abstract and Utopian ideals of the culture to criticize and revise
these conventions.
Several aspects of this style of argument seem well suited to the
forms of journalism. One of these is the emphasis on the provisionality
of political prescription. Provisionality seems both a virtue, since it reflects Unger's ideal of the continuously self-revising society, and a necessity, since from the perspective of modernist critique, any particular
commitment seems an unstable compromise of conflicting concerns. A
closely related aspect is the insistence on the contextual nature of social
and political thought. In showing that the abstract propositions of social
and moral theory do not yield the conclusions conventionally drawn
from them, critique forces programmatic thought to focus more concretely on particular social circumstances.
Another relevant aspect of Unger's prescriptive style is its attentuation of the distinction between working within the system and fighting to
change the system, or between reform and revolution. The conventional
distinctions presuppose that the social system has a determinancy that
deconstructive critique refutes. Unlike many theorists of the left, Unger
both envisions dramatic social transformation and insists on the political
meaningfulness of small-scale, incremental change. He suggests that
transformative ideals can inform political projects of widely varying degrees of ambitiousness. Thus, he is able to point to short-term incremental reforms with the potential to contribute to broader transformative
possibility, as well as more radical forms of reconstruction.
All these traits of Unger's theoretical approach would seem to make
his style of argument compatible with some of the conventions of contemporary journalism. Indeed, one complaint that might be made about
The Country in a Daze is that it is not journalistic enough, that it is too
14 THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT at 15-22.
15 FALSE NECESSITY at 355-95.
16 Id. at 580.
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sweeping and abstract and does not entirely satisfy the appetite it awakens for concrete description.
Other characteristics of Unger's approach-his concern with explicating his theoretical presuppositions and the visionary aspects of his
thought-square less readily with journalistic conventions, especially
those of American journalism, which favor a pseudo-pragmatic style of
discourse that is reluctant to acknowledge or examine its premises and
which takes place within a narrow ideological range. And although
American newspapers devote an increasingly large amount of space to
policy debate, they do not present political discourse oriented around an
explicit, comprehensive program of reform. It is hard to imagine a major
American newspaper giving an individual or group the space that Brazil's largest newspaper gave Unger to develop a political analysis or
program.
The portions of the newspaper pieces that summarize some of the
critical theoretical arguments in Politics (most of which are omitted in
the summary given here) strike me as considerably less successful in their
journalistic form. It is hard to make clear the relevance of the critique of
the premises of conventional discourse without a fairly elaborate analysis
showing that the propositions discussed are in fact presupposed in conventional discourse. On the other hand, the more specifically programmatic portions of the argument do not suffer comparably from their more
compressed exposition. They do acquire a more dogmatic and hortatory
tone than they have in the treatise, but this seems appropriate to partisan
political discourse, even one that aims to unsettle traditional boundaries
of partisanship. Given space constraints and the prohibition on technical
discussions, the articles cannot offer more than a superficial defense of
the controversial positions of the platform. But for the purposes of refocusing discussion and interest, or more ambitiously, of defining a political movement, the brevity, accessibility, and liveliness of exposition seem
advantageous.
Unger's Brazilian journalism offers a model of a style of argument
that combines critical and programmatic discourse that overlaps but is
partially distinct from that of Politics. The form of his jouralistic manifesto has great promise, as well as venerable antecedents, though it would
take a considerable liberalization of the editorial practices of American
journalism to accommodate its revival here.

